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Arising out of a precious metal refining process con-
conducted by a Johannesburg Consolidated Investment
Company Limited group company are various residues.
These residues occur at s8veral stages of the refining
process with each one b9ing substantially diflerent
in terms of chemical 8nd physical properties. The
importance of these resi.dues liE::.:' in thei'L'valuable
metals content. This can vary in a.wide region.
It is not feasible to continually return these residues
to the refinery circuit as this will eventually lead to
process stream dilution and excessively large quantities
to be treated.
Gn the basis of some preliminar:v investigational work
carriecl out by Johnson Matthey Research Laborator-Ies
in Ensland it was decided to pursue the feasibility
of a hydrochlorination process to further treat these
residues. This process has a great potential in the
processing of concentrate feed material whereby 00-
wanc.ed base metals can be removed at the beginning
of the refining process thus reducing the quantities
of internal residues produced.
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Chapter' 2 of this pY'\ject report will review literature
of some important opetational aspects to such a hydro-
chlorination fa~ility as safety, maintenance, cost
estimation, and materials selection. Chapter 3 details
the experimental work conducted, chapter 4 the results
and discussicn, while the conclusions and reco~menda-
tions are given in chapter 5.
1.2. Aim
The project had as its aim, the development of a hydro-
chlorination roasting facility to upgrade internal
process residues to levels where they could be returned
to the refinery. This would include tests to charac-
terize the most important residues, determination of the
optimal operating conditions and construction of the
plant. A successful pilot plant was necessary before a
prototype unit could be com~issioned at the precious
metals refinery and to this end, upscaling tests were
carried out at the group laboratories - Minerals Proces-
sing Research Laboratories in Germiston.
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1.3. Scope and Limitations
Due to the complexities involved in con3tructing a
reactor to accommodate high temperatures and hydrogen
chloride and sulphide gaseous environ~ents, a batch type
reactor was envisaged. Although future scope does exist
for the design of a continuously fed plant. The engi-
neering design should be simple, yet resistant to
hydrogen chloride at up to 1 000 °c for extended
periods. Good contact is required between reactive
gas and feed. Precious metal losses must be mi!1imised
with zero losses being the desired goal. The safe
operation of the plant by unskilled labour and local
plant conditions are important limitations.
The reactor is expected to handle dll the residues
identified as being economically attractive. The
reactions are gas-solid with all the residue materials
being dry povders ,
!4. e •••••••
The major identif::'ableU"'1itation to the process was
the availability of a 8uitabla reactor material. The
combined effect of high 0perating temperatures and
aggressive environment, reduced the ch~ice to exotic
materials, ceramics, and temperature resistant stain-
less steels. Sev~ve manufacturing problems as well as
poor operating performances were encountered with the
ceramic materials. The stainless steel mat8rial per-
formed adequately, but its service life was drastically
reduced due to severe sucrace scaling. Eventually this
lead to the failure of the reactor.
1he project involved investigating the saf~ty design
aspects of such a facility with special regard to the
toxicity of the gases involved. The poss.tbi.lLtnes of
production losses and personal injury were also inves-
tigated.
1~heoverall viability of the project rests on its
profitability. Capital costs are estimated using
upscale methods, Very careful estimations are made
eince no comparable facility exists from which
inferences and interpolations could be made.
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2. LITERfu.muRE REVIEW
The appl.l.cat.Lonof the hydrochlorination technique to
the metal refinir!3 industry was first attempted by
Johnson Matthey Research Centre in England (24, 25).
However, no further published literature is avaUable.
A review of the literature of some aspects required in
the design of a hydrochlorination facility are given
in this chapter.
2.1.
2.1.1.
Hazard Evaluation
Introduction
This section describes a selection of hazard evaluation
procedures for identifying and evaluating process
hazards. Process safety and loss control are important
aspects of an industrial plant.
Hazard identification requires very C8!:':::fulconside-
ration to anal~'~'3matters as they are and to conceive
of how they might be. Hazard evaluation procedures
have been developed to identify the hazards that exist,
the consequencee that might o";;curas a result of the
hazards, the likelihood that event..s might take place
that would cause an accident with sllcha consequence,
and the likelihood that safety systems, mitigating
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systems, emergency alarms and evaluation plans woul j
function properly. This would eliminate or reduce the
dangerous consequences.
Many procedures can be used to provide e:i.therquantita-
tive or qualitativG results for decision making - this
section will review the procedures for qualitative
results. Effective hazard control requires a syste-
matic, comprehensive and precise analysis of the system
and its operation.
2.1.2. Elements of an Accident
The purpose of hazard evaluation is to identify pos-
sible accidents and estimate their frequency and con-
sequenc~s. In the guidelines prepared by the Center
for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute
of Chemical Engineers (1), an accident is defined as
a specifl.c unplanned sequence of events that has an
undesirable consequence. The first event of the
sequence is the initiating event. Usually there are
one or more events between the initiating event and
the consequence. These intermediate events are to
responses of the system and its operators to the
initiating event. Different responses to the same
initiating event will often lead to different accident
consequences.
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It is further stated that the accident 1:>9 seen as a
sequence of events because in theory, each individual
event represents an opportunity to reduce the frequency
or consequence of the accident. The system and opera-
tor responses are of two types : propagating, where the
accident continues to propagate through the system; ana
ameliorating, where special systems or procedures come
into play to reduce the level of consequences of the
accident.
An evaluation of the hazards introduced by highly
reactive, impurity - sensitive, or toxic materials
should 1:>9 a par-t of the concept development phase (1).
Alternative materials should be considered and the
penalties of using them compared to the cost of con-
trols and safety systems that the more hazardous
materials might require. Prior to completion of the
plant design and construction, a thorough search for
nev hazards and new accident; event sequences should
be made. Adherence to good practice and predictive
hazard evaluation are two basic appro~che~ to hazard
control (1).
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The engineering analysis of plant behaviour undel upset
conditions provtdes the basis for estimating the extent
of propagation of the accident within the plant. It
provides the amou:1t of release of flammable, combus-
tible, hi.g'al.y reactive, or toxic mater·ials to the area
surrounding the plant.
The probabilities of the accident event sequences can
be estimated easily if it is obvious that the probabi-
lity is dominated by a single event and frequency data
are available for that event. If that is not the case,
the pertinent systems of the plant can be modelled with
logic diagrams. The probability of each acctder.t can
then be determined from the combined probabilit:i.esof
the Indtvf dual events ip.the event sequence. Evr:nt
Tree Analysis, described in section 2.1.3., can be
used for this technique (1).
Hazard evaluation procedures can be used to reduce
risk, for example by reducing the inventory of hazar-
dous material that could ~8 involved in an accident.
It is a good method for reducing the consequence and
thereby the risk. Sometimes a reduction in frequency
of hardware malfunction or human error by better com-
ponents, better maintenance, redundant components,
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better training, better instrumenG displays etc. is
the means of reducing risk. In other cases, safety
systems will stop the propagation of an accident, but
only if they fur.ction properly - which addresses tIp-
probability factor again. It is further explained (1)
that mitigation systems that do not affect the proba-
bility of the event sequence, but do mitigate the con-
sequences, may be a cost-effective way of reducing risk.
2.1.3. Even:!!, Tree Analysis
Event Tree Analysis is a technique for evaluating
potential accident outcomes resulting from a specific
eqUipment system failure or human error as an initia-
ting event (2). The results of the Event Tree Analysis
are a chronological set of fqilures ar errors that
define an accident. These results describe the pos-
sible accident outcomes jn terms of the sequence of
events (successes or failures of safety functions)
that follow an initiating event.
Data requirements for an Event Tree Analysis include:
knowledge of initiating events that is, equipment
failures or system upsets that can potentially cause
an accident. Also required are a knowledge of safety
system function or emergency procedures that potentially
mitigate the effects of an initiating event.
/10fl . .t •••••
Event trees are a modified form of the decision trees
traditionally used in business applications and prvvide
a precise way of recording the accident sequences. They
also define the relationships between the initiating
events and the subsequent events that combine to result
in an accident. By ranking the accidents, or through a
subsequent quantitative evaluation, the most important
accidents are identified (3).
2.1.4. Hazard and Operability (HAWP) Studies
The HAZOP study was developed to identify hazards in a
prcc; ~lant and to identify operability problems
which, though not hazardous, could compromise the
plants' ability to achieve design productivity (4).
HAZOP was originally developed to anticipate hazards
for new and/or nOV8l technology where past exper.ience
is 1imiteci. Multidisciplin8.ry teams are formed (4)
that work tocether (brainstorming) to identify hazards
and operability problems by searching for deviations
from design intents. The results of a HAZOP study are
typically qualitative.
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2..1.5. FailU!:_e Modes, Effects, and
Criticality ~alysis
Failure r,1odes,Effects, and Criticality Analysis
(['MECA)is a tabulation of the system/plant equipment,
their failure modes, e~ch failure modes' effect on the
system/plant, and a criticality ranking for each
failure m06e (1). The failure mode is a description
of how equipment fails (open, closed, on, off, leaks,
etc,).
The effect of the failure mode is the system response
or accident resulting from the equipment failure.
FMECA identifies single failure modes that either
directly result in or contribute significantly to an
important accident. Human errors are generally not
examined in a FMECA.
It is said (1) that FMECA is not efficient for identi-
fying combinations of equipment failures that lead to
accidents. The results are qU5litative in nature.
The data requirements for a FMECA analysis include a
system/plant equipment list and knowledge of equipment
and plant functions. This can be a drawback, since
the knowledge and experience necessary is often only
gleaned after a plant has been commissioned.
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2.1.6. Cause-Con~quence Analysis
Cause-consequence analysis is similar to Event Tree
Analysis (discussed in Rection 2.1.3.) for evaluating
potential accidents. A major strength (5) of Cause-
Consequence Analysis is its use as a communication
tool. The method can be used to quant.ify the expected
frequency of occurrence of the consequences if the
appropriate data are available.
Date requirements include a knowledge of component
failures or process upsets that could cause accidents
and knowledge of safety systems or emergency proce-
dures that can influence the outcome of an accident.
2.1.7. Human Error Analysi~
Th~ final hazard evaluation procedure to be reviewed
is human error analysis. This is a systematic evalua-
tion of tljefactors that influence the performance of
human operators, maintenance staff, technicians, and
other plant personnel. A human error analysis will
identify error-likely situations that can cause or
lead to an accident. It can also be used to trace the
cause of a given type of human error and can be per-
formed in conjunction with a human factors engineering
analysis.
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The results are qualitative in nature with th; relative
ranking of errors being based on probability of occur-
renee o~ severity of consequences (6). Data require-
mer.ts include plant procedures, information from inter-
views of plant personnel, plant layout and task alloca-
tion, and control panel layout and alarm system layout.
2.1.8. ThctOI'5Affecting whichProcedure is Selected
Potential consequence levels can be evaluated whereby
"worst case" conservative estimates of consequence
levels can influence the choice of hazard evaluation
procedure. For example, a potential large release of
toxic materials can justify a mor~ complete and
detailed search for events and combinations of events
that could cause such a release. Conversely, if there
is high confidence of a low hazard level, a less
exhaustive search for causes may be in order (7).
Provided that the procedures limitations are comple-
tely understood, familiarity of staff with certain
procedures is an argument for using hazard evaluation
techniques. Procedures are only as good as the data
input and in the situation where quantitative results
dre required this is even mo~e important.
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Time fcr analysis and cost of the evaluations should
not be an absolute factor in the choice of hazard
evaluation procedures. However, it is a factor which
should be compared to the cost of risk reduction
opportunities which might obviate or reduce the cost
of the analysis (1).
2.2. Maintenance
2.2.1. Introduction
The maintenance analysis of a system hqs as its objec-
tive the identification of failure situations and the
formulation of appropriate maintenance pol.Lc.les, The
maintenance of plant to reduce failures and stoppages
is discussed in this section.
2.2.2. Maintenanc~ Activities
Lees (7)mentions some maintenance activities which are·
carried out on process plants.
(1) Production assistanca - adjusting machine and
process settings.
(2) Servicing - replacement of consumables, including
lubrication.
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(3) Running maintenance - running repairs with little
interruption to production.
(4) Shutdown maintenance - scheduled repair or over-
haul with Intevruptaon to production.
(5) Breakdown maintenance - unscheduled repair with
interruption to production.
The formulat:i.onof maintenance policies and the moni-
toring of maintenance activities, requires a suitable
maintenance information system. Maintenance informa-
tion would include failures responsible for hazardous
conditions, plant downtime, and those responsible for
direct repair costs.
2.2.3. Failure Regimes
The three regimes are early failure, constant, or ran-
dom failure, and wearout failure. Lees (7) is in no
doubt as to the occurrence of the three regimes in
different equipments and also in the same plant.
Failure data may be fitted to the Weibull distribution.
The relation between the failure regime and the Weibull
shape factor {3 is :-
{3 <1 Early failure
{3 =1 Constant failure
{3>1 Wearout failure
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In many cases the equipment appears to be in the random
or constant failure regime. If the failures of the
equipment are truly random, then there is little point
in carrying out scheduled maintenance or replacement.
On the other hand, failure of an equipment is rarely
truly random. If an equipment appears to be in the
constant failure regime, it is usually worthwhile
probing further. Often the apparent constant failure
characteristic is due to the non-constant failurG
characteristics of the components of which it is con-
stituted (7).
2.2.4. Wearout Failure
Since many equipments exhibit a wearout characteristic,
the life may be determined and the equip:nent given
scheduled maintenance. On the assumptf.on that wearout
follows a normal failure distribution and the mean life
to wearout is m, the corresponding standard deviation
is d , then the maintenance policy is to overhaul or
replace at a time mo where ~-
m = m - kdo
and d is often taken as 0,1 m and kd is typically 0,6 m
the above equation becomes :-
mo = 0,4 m.
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2.2.5. Early Failure
The occurrence of early failure in many equipments is
perhaps less expected, bu':has been f'ound in process
plant. The early failure regime is not necessarily
associated ,Jnlywith the commissionic5 phase of tne
plant life. It is sometimes found in plants which
are relatively old. Some reasons for early failure
include (7) :-
(1) Cesign and commissi .:lUingfaults
(a) incorrect specification
(b) incorrect ....election
(c) incorrect design
Cd) manufactur-ing faults
(e) construction/installation faults.
(2) Maintenance taults
(a) incorrect fault identification
(b) incorrect repair techni~ue
(c) incorrect replacement parts
(d) Incor-rect; reassembly
(e) airty working conditions.
(3) Startup stresses : Mechanical stress aDd
temperature stress.
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In many cases the ma.intenance deficiencies can be
traced to inadequate training or work discipline (7).
As a result of early failure the overall failure rate
of the equipment is higher than it need be and never
settles down to the lower constant failure rate which
might be regarded as the more normal condition.
2.3.
2.3.1.
Cost Estimating
Introduction
The economic viability of any project is under question
from its inception. It is important that realistic and
reasonably accurate estimates of i.tsfixed capital cost
should be available at an early stage in its develop-
ment. Once a project has been approved the cost esti-
mate, after suitable refinement, becomes a yardstick
against which total project progress and success is
measured. This section will discuss aspects of cost
estimating and the methodology of cost ~stimates.
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2.3.2. ~thodology of Cost Est:!mates
Once the purpose of an estimate i~ established, the
type of information available must be investigated and
the scope of the work covered by the estimate must be
defined. The next step would be to determine the time
available for its preparati.on and the amount of effort:
that can be put into it. This, in turn, will fix the
type of estimate required, the procedure to follow,
and will determine the degree of accuracy expected.
Exponential Costing
Exponential methods permit cost estimates to be made
rapidly by extrapolating cost data from ana scale to
another. Thus the total cost of a proposed plant can
be derived from historical cost data by using :-
(1) The total cost of a similar (reference) plant.
(2) A comparatively simple breakdown of the costs
of a similar plant.
(3) Costs for parts of related plants that can be
assembled to represent the proposed plant.
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The Institution of Chemical Engineers (8) discusses
the basis for the cost of a specific item (for example
a pump, furnace, reactor etc.). This normally depends
on size or scale and can usually be correlated by the
approximate relationship :-
•• $ 2.3.1.
Where C = Cost of the item at size or scale S.
Cr = Cost of the reference item at size or
scale Sr.
n = Scale exponent.
The dimensions of S must be chosen to suit the type
of item. Scale exponents (n) are usually between 0,3
and 1,0, typically 0,6; for this reason the exponen-
tial method is often dubbed the "six-tenths rule".
Balfour et al (9) cautions against differences between
two identical process plants. A different location
invariably dictates different condHions. The weakness
of this procedure lies in the uncritical application of
this formula. A. fundamental understanding of the
limitations of the method is required in order that
ad,justment for scope and compost tion of cost, cost
escalation, economic conditions, s~~cial site c~ndi-
tions, and productivity can be made.
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De la Mare (10) eJtimates the capital cost of a single
machine or a complex p~ocess from the following
relationship :-
where : CA =: capital cost of proposed plant.
CB ::-:kno.m capi.tal cost of an existing plant
QA = production ~pacity of the proposed ;lant
QB = production capacity of the existing plant
a = appro~riate C)st exponent factor
II = index of cost jr.Llation
Ip = index of prod. :ctivity improvement.
The error involved with this technique is usually in
the range ten tc thirty percent of r,peactual fina~
cost.
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Functional Unit ~thod
This method, which is also known as the module method,
is often used in chemical and closely related indus-
tries. Essentially, it relates the capital cost of a
plant to the conditions affecting its capacity, com-
plexity, severity of operations and the number of
distinct steps in its production process. De la Mare
(10) represents this method in general functional form
by the expression .-
C = f(N.Q.T.P.M.)
Where : C = the total capital cost of the project
f = the functional relationship
N = the number of distinct process steps
Q = the capacity of the process
T = some temperature relationship
P = some pressure relationship
M = some relationship which allows for various
materials of construction.
This method is qble to provide estimates with errors
in the range of fifteen percent. Such a technique is
therefore most useful at the initial stages of a pro-
ject;where detailed flow-sheets and designs are not
available.
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F.actorial Costing
This technique, which is attributed to Lang (11),
relies on detailed cost estimates of the main plant
items (MPI), which constitute the production process.
The simplified expression i.sgiven below :-
Tee = FL. (CMPI)
where : Tee = total installed capital cost of the plant
FL = overall average Lang factor
~~I = delivered total capital cost of the main
plant items.
Lang factors have been derived and typical values for
these factors for relatively smalI projects are 3,9
for plants using solids only, 4,1 for plants using
solid-fluid processes, and 4,8 for plants using fluid
processes only. These factors allow for the civil and
structural engineering works required to support plant
and machinery, supply of electrical, gas, fuel, water,
air and refrigeration services, the interconnection of
the main plant items by ducting and piping and for
their instrumentation and insulation. Errors involved
in factorial costing are usually quite low and in the
range of approximately ten percent (10).
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De la Mare (10), furthermore, emphasizes two important
points relating to the use of this technique. Firstly,
the factors invariably relate to equipment fabricated
from mild steel. Some correction factors would have
to be used if items were fabricated from more expensive
and exotic materials. Secondly, these cost estimates
only include the cost of equipment within a plants'
battery limits.
An improved Lang factor approach to capital cost esti-
mating has been put forward by Montfoort and Meyer
(13). The dependence of the Lang factor on equipment
cost or on production capacity is well represented by
the following equations :-
L = A' (Eo.cf»0.22 •(E/CI)-O,22
Where : L = Lang faGtor
A = Enterprise dependant factor
Eo = Basic cost of an uninstalled ~quipment item
cf> = correcticn factor for relative throughput,
reaction time, storage time, multistreaming
and special processing methods.
E = Long factor related to mean equipment cost
CI = plant cost index (referenced 100 to 1970)
and
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L ::::5,6 .pO,11
where : L = Lang factor
p = plant output in thousands of tonnes per
annum.
Although useful in preliminary cost estimates for a
company, care should be exercised as to some of the
limitations. These we.ul.dnotably be the Lang factor
modifications with regard to plant capacity and
output.
2.3.6. Allowing for Productivity Improvements
The estimation of a capital cost should also allow for
productivity improvements during the design, fabrica-
tion and erection stages of a project as well as during
its subsequent operation. Improvements to the produo-
tion capacities of plants and machines can be quite
adequately modelled by the following equation, which is
attributed to Hirschmann (12) :-
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where : Qt = the plant capacity at some time t
Qo = the plant capacity as designed
Qoo = some upper limit in the capacity of
that plant after debottlenecking.
e = exponent 2,71828
k = emperical learning coefficier.t
t = time interval since the plant was f"';}"')C"'+-...L ...... ,n",
built.
2.4. MatBrials Selectial
2.4.1. Introduction
This section will aim to review some of the important
aspects regarding the materials of construction for
this project. In particular, it will focus on the
materials requirements for the reactor part which is
subjected to high temperatures and aggressive atmos-
pheres. With these constraints, no suitable material
could be found tha.twould satisfy the operating con-
ditions as wl~ll as the design and fabrication or pro-
cessing limitations. Thus, a range of matertals was
considered to determine the most suitable under COnl-
mercially available fabrication, operating, and cost
conditions.
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II'the context of motivation for selection of materials,
Crane and CharIes (14) have shown how the situation
regarding the selection process imposes its own con-
straints on how the problem is approached, and the way
in which an answer is provided. Frequently, only
materials that ~3n be obtained within the planned
production programme are allowable. This is a situa-
tion which militates against the exotic or non-standard
solution.
Often decisions also have to be made without the b2ne-
fit of the best possible data. Finally, the process
of selecting a promising material ·Hillbe done
initially in terms of the required properties, but
final decisions will always involve considerations of
cost. This in most cases will be the domipant criterion.
2.4.2. Service Requirements and Failure Analysis
Pick (15) has said that "Material - and process -
selection always involves the act of compromise - the
selection of a combination of properties to meet the
conflicting technicals commercial, and econcmic consi-
derat.Ione",
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Crane and Charles (14) put forward that frequently all
that can be done is to take account of the relative
importance of various service requirements and pitch
the compromise accordingly. Thus in formalized quan-
titative selection procedures, weighting factors are
applied to individual properties in reaching the best
compromise. A weighted properties method has been
formalized by Waterman (16).
The causes of failure in service, according to Crane and
Charles (14), can be classified as arising from a number
of main origins. These include errors in design,
inherent defects in a mater-tat properly selected,
defects introduced during fabrication and deterioration
in service. The possible mechanisms of failure are
brittle and ductile fracture, fatigue (high or low
cycle), creep, buckling, corrosion, corrosion fatigue,
stress corrosion, and wear processes.
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Corrosion of Sta~nless Steels by Hot Gases
Although stat.ilese steels are popular materials for
high temperature service, they will react with most
gases at high tamperature to form surface scales.
Conditions that give rise to very slow scale growth
are obviously desirable. Those that favo~r rapid
scale growth are undesirable since rapid formation
will quickly consume the stainless steel. In some
gases (for example halogens), volatile reaction
products can be formed which vapourize from the sur-
face. In other cases there is preferential brittle
oxide formation along grain boundaries. Accordingly,
it is not possible to describe attack by high tempera-
ture gases in terms of any single unifying mechanism
(14) •
Sulfidation is a term used to describe attack by hign
temperature gases containing sulphur compounds such as
sulphur dioxide, hydrogen sulphide or sUlphur vapour.
Sedriks (17) states that attempts to define sulfidation
in terms of gas/mete! reactIons are further complicated
by th= fact that attack can sometimes be caused by
molten phases such as low meltin8 point metal/metal
sulphide eutectics as given in Table 2.1. (18) below :-
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TABLE 2.1. - Melting Points of Several Metal/
Metal Sulphide Eutectics
Eutectic Melting Point, °c
Ni-Ni3S2 645
Co-Co4S3 880
Fe-FeS 985
AI-AlxSx ~1070
Cr-CrS ~1350
It is reported (19) that although the scaling rates of
high chromium stainless steel~ are higher in dry suI-
ptur dioxide environments than in air the scaling
resistance of these materials is considered acceptable.
The higher scaling rates in sulphur dioxide are attri-
buted to the formation of chromium suiphides below the
protective chromium oxide scale.
The machani.sm is thought, (17) to be associated wi.th
the regenerat ton of free sulphur which can react with
the chromium and the other alloy constituents. The
generally accepted maximum service temperatures for
stainless steels in sulphur dioxide environments are
shown in Table 2.2. (18).
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TABLE2.2. - Generally Accepted MaximumService
Temt:eratures in Sulphur Di.oxtde ::or
Selected S~ainless Steels
Material Temperatur'e, °c
304 800
321 800
347 800
310 1050
410 700
430 8~
446 1025
Corrosion of sta:Lnless steels and higher alloys in high
temperature chlor-ine and hydrogen chloride can best be
understood by rec:ognizing that different processes
govern the corrosion rate at high and low temperatures •.
At high temperatures, the corrosion process is governed
by the formation ~nd volatilization of the chloride
scale. Thus the maximunoperating temperatures are
l
generally a runctaon of the nickel content of the
alloy, since ni.ckel forms one of the least volatile
chlorides (17). At lower temperatures ,. chloride scaling
rates are probably detarmined by diffusion through the
chlo~ide scale and the protectiveness of this scale.
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For stainless st=els the upper temperature limit for
operatf.on in dry chlorine and hydrogen chl.orIde is
about 320 °c as Indfcated in Table 2.3. (20).
TABLE 2.3. - Corrosion of Stainless Steels in Dry
Chlorine and Hydrogen Chloride at
ElEvated Temperatures
Approximate Temperature, °c for
Given Corrosion Rate *
Gas M9.terinl --
30 mils/yr 60 mils/yr 120 nila/yr'
304 290 315 345
1
316 315 345 400
304 345 400 455
2 316 370 370 480
309+Cb 345 400 455
1 = Chlorine
2 :::Hydrogen Chloride.
* :::Corrosion rate based on short term tests of two to
twenty hours.
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For higher temperature service, higher nickel alloys or
pure nickel are necessary. Since at these higher tempe-
ratures volatilization of the chloride is taking place,
the corrosion rate is also affected by gas flow rate,
chlorine partial pressure, and specimen configuration.
Dry hydrogen chloride is slightly less corrosive than
dry chlorine (17).
Alternative Materials
The only range of alternative materials that are
available for high temperature aggressive environments
are the refractory metals and ceramics. The refractory
metals such as tungsten, tnntalum, and molybdenum are
commercially available. However, they possess low
resistance to oxidation. The ceramics, or more speci-
fically engineering ceramics, consist of sintered oxides
of altuninium, magnesium, beryllium, zirconium, thorium
and certain borides, carbides, nitrides and silicides.
These are generally polycrystalline containing little or
no glass phase.
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All ceramics are hard and brittle and vulnerable to
thermal shock. Carbides and borides tend to oxidize
rapidly at temperatures above 1 (XX) °c (14). The most
promising ceramics for advanced engineering applica-
tions are silicon carbide and silicon nitride which
are resistant to scaling and oxidation and able to
vith stand temperatures up to 1 200 °c in aggress lve
gaseous environments. Generally (16) the oxide-h3.sed
cerami.csare subject to attack in oxid~,zingatmospheres
having a high sulphur content. Carbide ceramics are
also oxidized at high temperatures (500 - 1 400 °c,
depending on the type).
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3. EXPERIMENl'AL PROCEDURE
3.1 • Introduction
The project was conducted on two levels namely labora-
tory scale and pilot scale. Much time, effort, and
money is saved on any project by conducting trials on
the laboratory scale before proceeding to production
scale. The laboratory scale was concerned with deter-
mining which residue materials were viable and to obtain
an indication of which parameters were important. The
pilot scale sought to validate the laboratory testwork,
as well as give an indication of expected production
problems. Details concerned with the laboratory and
pilot scale testwork will be discussed in this section.
3.2. Process D::!sign
Chlorination reactions are generally conducted in fluid
bed reactors. However, because of the sr~cial oemands
on the process for treating precious metal residue
materials, namely to prevent contamination of the impu-
rity condensate with purified precious metals and to
achieve optimum hydrogen chloride utilisation a down-
flow, vertical packed bed batch reactor was considered
to be more effective and simpler to construct and
operate.
/"'!;6 ••••••••
In broad terms hydrochlorination involves the passing
of hydrogen chloride gas through the packed bedo The
operating temperature in this instance ranges between
800 and 1 <XX) °eo Gas-solid reactions occur in which
volatilization of the base metal chlorides takes nlaceo
A high temperature filter prevents solid particles from
passing through but permits the base metal chloride gas
to pass down the reactor. The material which remains
unhydrochlorinated, that is that which does not pass
througtl the filter, is the enriched residue containing
a higher level of precious metals.
On reaching the cooler zones of the reactor, gas conden-
sation occurs. To this end a condenser is attached to
the bottom end of the reactor where the solid base
metal chlorides are collected. The exhaust gases pass
through a wet p. :':i.ibberwhere any remaining toxic sub-
stances are dissolved and co]Iected, Figure 3.1. shows
a schematic of the hydrochlor-Inatrionprinciple as used
in this project.
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FIGURE 3.1. - Schematic Showing the Hydrochlorination
Principle
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3.3. laboratory Scale Apparatus
The laboratory scale testwork was carried out using a
silica glass reactor and condenser and single zone
electric tube furnace. The silica glass reactor was
one metre long with a porous filter positioned halfway
from the top. Its diameter was 27 mm. l30thends were
ground and flanged to facilitate easy connection of
the reactor head and condenser. Reactor pressure was
monitored using an in-line manometer. Temperature
was measured using a t~e K thermocouple placed in a
thermowell extending down into the material beir.g
tested and recorded on a Camille Bauer temperature
recorder.
Heating was by means of a single zone electric tube
furnace with a six kilowatt fifteen amp power rating
and a Eurotherm furnace controller. Heating rates
from room temperature to 1 000 °c were approximately
forty minutes. Gas flowrates were monitored using a
Krone flowmeter. Hydrogen chloride (technical grade
99,5 perc~nt) and nitrogen were dispensed from standsrd
40 kf.Iogram gas cylinders. Gas flowrates were main-
tained between six and ten 1itres per hour depending
on the test.
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Nitrogen was used to create an inert atmosphere during
heat up and cool down periods thus preventing any pos-
sible oxidation of the residue material.
The high temperature filter used in this project was
specially developed to be resistant to the high tempe-
ratures and aggres Lve environment. It consisted of a
coarse silica disc upon which was placed an alumina
silicate cloth commonly used in heat insulation appli-
cations. The disc provided the necessary rigidity,
while the cloth acted as an excellent fine particle
high temperature filter. Tne operation of this high
temperature filter proved most adequate. A conven-
tional glass flask was used as the condenser. The
laboratory apparat~~ is shown in Figure 3.2.
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A Furnace controller
B Temperature recorder
C Electric furnace
D Silica reactor
E Condenser
F Gas supply
FIGURE 3.2. - Figure Showing the Laboratory Scale
Apparatus
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3.4 . Corrosion Tests
Simulated corrosion tests were conducted on three
stainless steel ar.done pure nickel material; these
being stainless steel Type 304, Type 316L, Type 310,
and an electrolytically produced nickel. The stain-
less steel specimens were cut from 15,0 mm round bar
in 10,0 mm slices. The nickel specimen had dimensions
25 m:n x 15 mm x 5 mm.
The tests involved placing the coupons in the labora-
tory scale silica glass tube. A routine hydrochlori-
natac,: test was selected for this purpose. The material
being tested was a common residue under usual conditions
of 1 (X)() "c, five tv ten litres per hour of hydrogen
chloride gas, and of three hour total duration.
3.5. Pilot Scale Facility
The pilot scale facility posed more difficulties than
did the laboratory scale apparatus. Where the silica
glass tube used in tne laboratory scale reactor was
totally reslstant and inert to the high temperatures
and aggressive environments involved, this silica glass
material could not be used in the pilot reactor.
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The reasons for this will be discussed in section 4.6.
Initially two silicon carbide reactors were specially
manufactured by Cumar Resistant Materials (Pty) Limit.ed
but failed in their trial runs. They were found to be
porous and th'is uosuitable. PreLiminary .mulation
tests were conducted on two other types of siliccn car-
bide namely :-
(1) A reaction bonded silicon carbide used in the pro-
duction of hydrogen chloride gas by means of a
hydrogen and chlorine burner nozzle. This is a
material unique to Sigri-Ringsdorf (Pty) Limited.
(2) A silicon carbide used in the high t8m~rature
nuclear industry and supplied by a West German
concern Nukem GmbH. The characteristics of this
material are classified.
Preliminary simulation tests involved th~ ~lac~ng of
a specimen of tbe p9.rentmaterial into the laboratory
scale reactor during one of the routine hydrochlorina-
tion tests. Any changes regarding surface appearance
and possible degradation or mass loss IVerenoted and
used in evaluating the suitability of a prospective
reactor material.
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Three stainless steel reactors were also fabricated.
Two were stainless steel Type 316L with dimensions
1,5P>m length, inside diameter 100,0 mm, and wall
thickness 4,0 mm. The third reactor was of ste.inless
steel Type 310 with dimensions 1,58 m length, inside
diameter 130,0 ~a, and wall thickness 5,0 mm.
The hig'n temperature filtp.r used in r.hepilot facility
was specially developed to tolerate the high tempera-
ture and aggressive environment as well as the larger
dimensions of the reactor, It consisted of a silicon
carblde fllter used in the metal casting industry and
was supplied by Foseco (Pty) Limited rrider +he trade
name Sedex. The same alumina silicste filter cloth as
used in the laboratory scale sys~em proviced the fine
particle filter mechanism. Thus, the Sedex disc pro-
vided the overall rigidity while the alumina silicate
cloth prevented the transport of any particles inclu-
ding any possible fine precf.ous metal pc:rticles. The
filter cloth was cemented to the Sedez disc at its
pe~iphery and positioned within the re~ctor on a fil-
tsr suppor-t ring. This is schematdcal Iy shown in
Figure 3.3.
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REAOTOR v.H\LL
ALUMINA SILIOATE
FILTER OLOTH
8TAI NLESS SrSEL
FILTER SUPPORT
RING
SILIOON OARBIDE
FILTER 0180
FIC:(JRE3.3. - Schematic Showing Pilot Scale High Tempe-
rature Fine Particle Filter Arrangement
Heating '.I9.S by means of a Carbolite three zone electric
furnace. The furnace was able to tilt from the hori-
zontal to the vertical position about its center.
Furnace output was 27 amps per phase with a maximum
temperature of 1 400°C along a heat8d zone of approxi-
mately t\ITOmetres and a cba=bsr size of 0,15m by 0,15m.
Figure 3.4. shows the complete pilot facility w:!.ththe
furnace and reactor in the vertical position.
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A Three zone electric furnace
B Condenser
C Ve\.'.scrubber
D ~3.s supply
E Furnace controller
F Tempere>'Jre recorder
G Stainless steel reactor
FIGURE3.4. - The Pilot );"acility for the Hydro-
chlorination Project
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Temperature was measured using a Type K thermocouple
protected by a stainless steel Type 316L thermowell.
The thermowell was situated in the centre of the
reactor and extended to within 20,0 mm of the filter.
Temperature was recorded on a Camille Bauer recorder.
Reactor pressure was measured using a Wika Instrurnen1;s
pressure gauge. Its wetted parts were protected by
polytetrafluorethylene (PTFE) against the hydrogen
chloride gas stream. Gas flowrates were measured
using a Krone flowmeter cal.Ibrated between 50 and
3 000 li tres per hour of gas.
Toxic exhaust gases from the glass condenser were taken
in by the wet scrubber. A vacuum was created using a
Venturi pipe in the scrubber system. The creation of
a vacuum to draw off the exhaust gases also prevented
the release of any toxic gases to the surroundings,
notably at the reactor end and condenser neck junction.
A laboratory jack was used to seat the condenser neck
onto the reactor bottom end.
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The residue material to be tested was loaded into the
reactor after the filter system was positioned, the Hd
bolted to the reactor flanged end, the reactor then
placed in the furnace, and clamped in position. The
furnace was then tilted to the vertical position, the
Jas and thermocouple connections made, and the conden-
ser lifted into position, the test would then be ready
to proceed.
3.6. Tharmal Conductivity Tests
In the initial stages of the project it was thought
that the thermal conductivity of the residue material
would be an important factor in the hydrochlorination
process. It was known that the hydrochlorination
reactions of base metals are endothermic and tt~t suf-
ficient heat was required to initiate and sustain the
reactions. It was thus necessary to ascer-tain the
nature of the thermal gradients within the reactor.
For reasons to be discussed in section 4.2. only the
times taken for specific samples to reach thermal
equilibrium were noted to yield an indication of the
thermal characteristics of a particular residue ma.te-
rial.
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Figure 3.5. shows a schematic of the apparatus employed.
Four different residue materials RI, AC, CU, and FA as
well as two more well known materials magnesium oxide
and silica were tested. The materials were all in their
naturally occurring dry powder forms. The powder was
poured into an insulated glass tub: of diametAr 23,0 mm
to a height of 75,0 wu. No compacting of the powder
was applIed. The glass tube was then placed on the hot
place and the time taken for the sample to heat up and
reach equilibrium was noted. The results are given and
discussed in section 4.2.
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FIGURE3.5. - Schematic Showing Thermal Charac-
terization Procedure
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4. RESULTS AND DIsaJSSION
4.1. Corrosion Tests
Four metallic materials were tested under simulated
hydrochlorination conditions which are described in
section 3.4. The corrosion rate given ~ millimetres
per year (mm/yr) was determined us;na the expression
given below (21) :-
Corrosion rate = 87,6.\v/(D.A.T.)
Where 'if = mass loss, mg
o = density, g/cm3
A = surface area, cm2
T = exposure time, hours
The corrosion rate of the four tested materials is
given in Table 4.1.
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TABLE 4.1. - Corrosion Rates
Material Type Mass L0SS Corrosiol1 Rate(mg) (mm/yr)
Electrolytic nickel 1986,0 482
Stainless Steel Type 304 4·91,0 355
Stainless Stee 1 Type 310 333,0 224
Stainless Steel Type 316L 206,0 138
The best corrosion resistant rates were achieved on the
sta:i.nlesssteels, Type 316L and Type 310. These cerro-
::lionrates may be considered as very high and would
normally be considered as totally unacceptable and
rejected out of hand. However, in the context of a
short life replaceable reactor under aggressive condi-
tions these two materials warranted further considera-
tion. It was largely on the basis of these results
that initially a Type 316L pilot scale reactor tube
and subsequently a Type 310 and Type 316L pilot scale
reactors were commissioned for testwork.
Since corrosion embraces the destruction or degradation
of materials the performance of the silicon carbide
materials tested is discussed in this section.
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Both silicon carbide samples were tested under the
identical conditions as the metallic materials. Dis-
appointing results were achieved. The Sigri-Ringsdorf
reaction bonded silicon carbide had a mass loss of
some ten percent. Apparent graphitization of some
regions and general degradation of the surface rendered
this material unsuitable for further investigation. The
Nukem supplied silicon carbide material showed a mass
loss of approximately eight percent after the simula-
tion hydrochlorination test. Surface degradation was
not uniform but localized to a few relatively large
areas on the surface. It was this phenomenon which
discouraged further consideration of this material and
in fact both _licon carbide materials.
4.2. Thermal Conductivity Tests
As stated in section 3.6. the hydrochlorination of
residue materials is an endothermic process. For this .-
reason it was necessary to gain an appreciation of the
thermal characteristics of the residue materials. The
results of the tests conducted, which are described in
section 3.6., are given in Table 4.2.
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TABLE 4.2. - Time Taken to Attain Thermal Equilibrium
Material Time to ThermFllEquilibrium (minutes)
RI 105
AC SD
CO 60
FA 65
MgO 60
Si02 75
The thermal conductivities of loose silica and magne-
sium oxide powders are in the 0,0001 cal/cm.s.oC
regime (22).
The major difficulty in evaluating thp thermal conduc-
tivity of the residue materials is the quantification
of the heat fluxes. Experimental models do exist (23) "
whereby the thermal conductivities of packed beds under
a forced gas flow can be evaluated. However, due to
the complexity and cost of instituting these models it
was decided not to investigate residue thermal conduc-
tivities.
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In order that an approximate estimate of the thermal
conductivities of the residue materials could be made
the test described in section 3.6. was conducted. From
the results given in Table 4.2. only comparisons can
be drawn and related to the known values for silica
and magn~sium oxide powders. Thus, it can be fairly
confidently concluded that the residue materials have
thermal conductivity values in the region of 0,0001
cal/cm.s.oe.
This is a low value for the therr:"llconducth Lty of a
solid but not abnormal in terms of. ';he fact that the
residues for hydrochlorination are fine powders. In
addition a large percentage, up to 50 percent, of the
residue comprises siHca and so it can be said the
interpolated thermal conductivity values are fair and
reasonable.
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4 •j. Hazard Evaluation
The aim of a hazard evaluation exercise is to identify
and evaluate process hazards. With regard to this
hydrochlorination project process, hazards on two levels
were able to be monitored. Namely, the laboratory appa-
ratus and the larger pilot scale facility. Since the
basic difference between the laboratory apparatus and
the pilot facility was the reactor-, some Inherent
hqzards on the one reactor mayor may not necessarily
have occurred on the other unit.
Hydrochlorination Hazard Elem:.'::~
Inh8rent in the hydrochlorination process was the use
of hydrogen chloride gas. It was supplied in 20 or 40
kilogram bottles. Pressure gauges, valves, and fit-
tings were of the Monel type to ensure t~ most effec-
tL:) resistance to corrosion and therefore component
failure.
The early failure, within twenty minutes, of the first
Monel regulator used on the l£Joratory apparatus
resulted in the leakage of hydrogen chloride gas. The
gas is pungent, toxic, and has a suffocating odour.
It is heavier than air and fumes strongly in the atmos-
phere. 'roo gas leak was visually detected by a dense
white fume.
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Inhalation of the hydrogen chloride caused irritation
of the upper raspiratory tract of the operator. A con-
centration of about 35 parts per million causes irri-
tation of the throat after short exposure. More severe
exposures result in pulmonary edema, and often in
Iarynageal. spasm. Skin contact with the vapour results
in severe skin irritation.
Concentrations of 1 3 00 to 2 or . parts per miEion in
air are letha: to humans on brief exposure (up to a few
minutes). The maximum that can be tolerated for several
hours exposure is 10 to 50 parts per million. 'roo
Threshold Limit Value is five parts per million.
Hydrogen chloride lealffican be detected well before a
hazardous situation arises. As was experienced in the
first incident, a gas leak was evldent by the formation
of white fumes on contact with the atmosphere. Small
leaks may be detected by holding an open bottle of con-
centrated ammonium hydrox.d? solution near the site of
the suspected leak. Dense white fu~es will evolve.
Wet blue litmus paper will turn pink when Exposed to a
hydrogen chloride leak.
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4.3.2. Hazard Evaluation
For the purpose of this project it was decided that the
hazard evaluation should take the form of an Event Tree
Analysis with an additional analysis using HAZOP and
FMECA.
The probabilities of failure r~quired for such an
analysis are dr.awn from the laboratory and pilot scale
operations. Four components of the hydrochlorination
design were identified as belng Lfkal.y 'hazardcausing
candidates.
(1) Hydrogen Chloride Gas Supply
This component was a direct function of the pro-
bability of failure of the regulators, valves,
and piping. Four Monel regulators were used in
the tests with the first one failing within twenty
minutes, The remaining three continued to perform
satisfactorily. The probability of failure under
the project conditions may then be taken as 0,25.
Valves and fittings. During the course of the
testwork one valve and two fittings needed replace-
ment. The overall number of valves and fittings
used was 14. :he probability factor was thus 0,2.
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4.3.2. Hazard Evaluation
Fo~ the purpose of this project it was decided that the
hazard evaluation should take the form of an Event Tree
Analysis with an additional analysis using HAZOP and
FMEeA.
The probabilities of failure required for such an
analysis are drawn from the laboratory and pilot scale
oper~tions. Four components of the hydrochlorination
design were identified as being likely hazard causing
candidates.
(1) Hydr0gen Chloride Gas Supply
This component was a direct function of the pro-
bability of failure of the regulators, valves,
and piping. Four Monel regulators were used in
the tests with the first one failing within twenty
.minutes. The remaining three continued to perform
satisfactorily. The probability of failure under
the project conditions may then be taken as 0,25.
Valves and fittings. During the course of the
testwork one valve and t\·:ofittings needed replace-
ment. The overall number of valves and fittings
used was 14. The probability factor was thus 0,2.
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Piping. The major piping material was quarter inch
(6,35 mm) polypropylene and a short section (0,5m)
length of Type 316L stainless steel tul::eon the
pilot facility which was in close proximity to the
furnace. Although no pipe failure was experienced,
a low probability of failure of 0,01 was expected.
(2) Furnace Operation
Factors which were expected to upset furnace opera-
tion were power failure, thermocouple malfunction,
and heating element failure. No power failure or
thermocouple malfunction was evidenced. A probabi-
lity factor of 0,01 was assigned. Two out of
eighteen heating elements broke yielding a probabi-
lity factor of 0,1.
(3) Reactor Failure
It was expected that the reactor would fail in ser-
vice. High temperature corrosion was found to be
the cause of failure on the first of three stain-
less steel reactor tnbes , The important aspect in
this situation was the early detection of a pos-
sible failure. It was established that after 40
hours service the reactor would be withdrawn from
service. The probability that the reactor would
fail before the 40 hour limit was set at 0,2.
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(4) Exhaust
The exhaust system consistE..dprimarily of the bottom
section of the reactor, the glass condenser, and wet
gas scrubbin6 unit. At no stage did the reactor it-
self block although it was expected to possibly do
so. This factor was thus set at 0,01.
Leakage of extremely toxic exhaust gases did ucca-
sionaEy occur at the junction of the reactor bottom
end and the condenser opening. This was overcome
with the introduction of a vacuum into t;he wet
scrubber. An external posttive pressure thus
prevented the escape of any toxic gases at this
junction and the probability of such an incident
occurring was reduced to 0,01.
The event tree for evaluating '~hepotential accident
outcome is given in Figure 4.1.
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HAZARD PROBABILITYFACTOR
COST
(RAND)HAZARD EVENT CAUSE OF HAZARD
REGULATOR o 25 3 500,
HYDROGEN CHLORIDE GAS SUPPLY 1 182 PIPING 0,01 70C
VALVES & FITTINGS 0,2 1 500
POViERFAILURE 0,01 500
FURNACE OPERATION 75 THERMOCOUPLE FAIL.URE 0,01 1 000
HAZARD HEATING ELEMENT FAILURE 0,1 600
REACTOR FAILURE 1 200 HIGH TEMPERATURE COR- 0,2 1 600ROSION
REACTOR 0,01 100
"
EXHAUST 11 GLASS CONDENSER 0,01 500
WET SCRUBBER 0~01 500
F 1(lURE4. 1. Hazard Eva1uat ion Event Tree
( \
I
C\
o
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The Event Tl'ee shown in Figure 4.1. required the cost
of a particular hazard cause. rni s was taken to be the
minim~~ replacement cost and the extent of disruption
to the process of a particular unit.
The hazard evaluation event tree was thus used to
quantitatively define the relationship between four
expected hazard events. The most important accident
identified was that which would occur due to the
Lydrogen chloride gas supply and the failure due to
high temperature corrosior..of the reactor.
4.4. Maintenance
The identlfication of failure or hazard situations was
discussed in section 4.3. Maintenance of plant and
equipment would "'limto reduce failures and stoppages.
This would enable the smooth and continuous o~ration
of the hydrochlorinati~n facility.
4.4.1. Failure Regimes
Three failure regimes are discussed in section 2.2.
namely, wearout failur:, constant or random failure,
and early faHure. In terms of the testwork carried
out on the pilot scale hydrochlorination facility all
three regimes were observed.
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Early failure, m.ViLb \~reibullshape factor f3 less than
one, was vIi tnessed vlj ~1the hydrogen chloride gas
regulator. Failure occurred within twe:_ntyminutes of
operation. The reason for this was a manufacturing
fault. Although it was not expected to fail, such early
failures are common to process plants. This type of
failure cannot be prevented, but by having a standby
unit the downtime and production loss can be minimised.
Constant or random failure, having a Weibull shape
factor {J equal to one, was observed in valve and fit-
tings failures. This was attributed to the corrosion
of these components which were fabric3ted from stain-
less steel Type 316L. The specifications called for
Monel components. Situations arose whereby Monel com-
ponents were not locally available and had to be air
freighted from overseas. In order that tastwork could
proceed In the intervening period the stainless steel
components, which ar ' locally available, were used.
In this situation it cannot be said that constant or
rar!dom failure was due to the non constant component
characteristic.
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\vearout failure, having a ~leibull shape factor {3 greater
than one, was evidanc9d in the failure of the stainless
steel Type 316L reactor on the pilot scale hydrochlori-
nation facility. The replacement of the reactor at 40
ho~r intervals would thus form part of a routine
replacement of a consumable item. It was this factor
whjch ensured the continued existence of the project.
As pointed out throughout this project report no com-
mercially available material was available which could
withstand the aggressive hydrogen chloride gas and high
temperature environment on a continuous basis.
4.5. Cost Estimation
A detailed cost estimate for the proposed production
hydrochlorination facility was not within th~ scope of
the project. In order that the future viability and
further testwork on th~ project could be justified a
preliminary cost estimate was required. This was based
on the costs incurred on the pilot hydrochlorination
facility.
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The exponential technique was used to estimate the
costs involved with the proposed hydrochlorination
facility. Rapid estimations are possible by extra-
polation of data from one scale to another.
Equations 2.3.1. and 2.3.2. given in section 2.3.3.
are used to arrive at capital cost estimates.
Major items that were included in the cost estimate
evaluation together with the amount are given in Table
TABLE 4.3. - Cost of Pilot Scale Itemr
Item Amount(Rand)
Tiltab19 three zone electric furnace* 60 (X)(),OO
Stainless yueel Type 310 reactor 5 (X)(),OO
Stainless steel reactor lid and thermowe ll 800,00
Pressure gauge and gas flowmeter 3 C'ifJ,OO
Thermocouples 500,0')
* Regarding the tiltable :'hree zone electric furnace:-
the amount quoted of R60 ()(X) ,OJ was based on the
replacement cost of the existing unit which was
imported from the United Kingdom ir.the early 1970's.
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The size of the pilot scale facility was described in
tel.illS of the quantity of residue material that was
charged. This averaged at five kilograms. A reasonable
upscaling factor of ten times resulted in a production
capacity of 50 kilograms per reactor batch.
The scale factor was 0,6. Equation 2.3.2. required
additional informati )n namely, the index of cost infla-
tion II and the index of productivity improvement Ip.
The cost of inflation WdS conservatIvely set at 15 per-
cent per annum. In keeping with normal business prac-
tice that ensured a productivity improvement which at
least matched the annual inflation rate this factor was
set at 15 percent per annum.
Thus, the capital cost estimate for th? proposed pro-
duction hydrochlorination facility was evaluated to
be R120 000. The error associated with this derived
estimate is in the range ten to thirty percent.
The capital cost estimate for the proposed production
facility was considered realistic. The expected return
from precious metals treatment justified the continued
progress of the project notably in terms of ('()i'imizing
the operating conditions and better characterization
of the precious metals residues being tre~ted.
F'
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4.6. Economic Evaluation
The economic viability of the proposed production hydro-
chlorination facility was investigated. A detailed
anaJysis was not consioered necessary since material
input and parameter optimisation had not been adequa-
tely quantified. It was, however, important that a
preliminary economic evaluation be carried out. No
mat~er how comprehensive or s')phisticated an investment
evaluation may be, uncer-tamty and risk "-illremained
factors in the evaluation.
Expected Net Present Value (ENPV), Expected Present
Value Ratio (EPVR) and Rate of Return (ROR) analysis
are methods of including the probabilities of occur-
rence for cu~ts and revenues directly into an analysis
using the expected value approach. ~ using appropriate
time value of money present worth factors to conver-t
costs and profits at different points in time to lump
sum values at the start of the project. The expected
value analysis approach could be applied to evaluate
the economic prudence of the investment in the project.
The expected value was calculated using the equation
below :-
Expected value = (p) (Income - Cost) - (1-p)(Cost)
....... 4.6.1.
where p = probability of project success
Income = revenue generated and
Cost = totsl capital cost incurred, Crc
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TotaJ capital cost is given by the eqU?tion :-
.......... 4.6.2.
From section 4.5. eFe was R120 000 and Cwc was
approximated to be ROO 000. Since tne hydrochl.or-Ina-
tion facility will be incorporated into an existing
plant c;.. is nil.
Regarding the income of the proposed facility no direct
Incoso is accrued. Income may be expressed in terms of
Irrtere..'lt earned on the reduction of precious metal in-
ventory, The value of this inventory at any give time
is R564 million. The incorporation of the hydro~hlori-
nation facility into the existing plant can be expected
to reduce the monthly inventory by one day. The monthly
inter·~.:;tearned is R3,34 million at an annual tnterast
rate of 18 percent.
The project has an initial investment of R200 000 (using
equation ~.6.2.) and a 0,3 probability that annual pro-
fits of R40,8 million will be realised during the five
year life of the facility. Using equation 4.6.1. the
ENPV is + R38 million. Since the ENPV is ,ositive the
project shows economic viability.
An expected ROR analysis yielded time vaiue of money or
interest of 52 percent. This is greater than 18 percent
and confirms the E~?V analysis of project econo~ic via-
bility.
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The EPVR ratio is + 190 and indicates that the projeot
economics are satisfactory.
4.7. Materials Selection
This section \vill discuss the materials that were con-
sidered for the hydrochlorination reactor unit. A
formalized selection procedur (16), introduced in
section 2.4.2. was used to quantitatively select the
optimum material.
Certain important engineering requirements were identi-
fied in the mat=r lal.cseIectii.onprocedure :-
(1) Porosity
The reactor unit had to be non-porous in view of
the toxicity of the reaction gases and the safe
containment of the process for material baJance
purposes.
(2) Temperature Resistance
The hydrochlorination process called for the opera-
tion up to temperatures of 1 000 °e. In addition to
elevated temperature resistance thermal cycling
would be a factor due to the batch operation of the
process.
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(3)High Temperature Corrosion
This is one of the most important single factors
that had to te addressed. in the reactor material
selection procedure. Oxidative corrosion would
normally occur at these given temperatures, how-
ever, this phenomenon was exacerbated by the
presence of the hydrog~n chloride atmosphere as
well as any sulphide gaseous reaction products.
(4) Fabrication
It wa~ preferred that the reactor [y; scurced within
this country. The design and standards of frabrica-
tion should be within the capabiities of a general
engineering works.
(5) Cost
Regarding cost, it was generally found that excessive:
costs were incurred once the material had to bA im-
ported. The cost of the die used in the manufacture
of the silicon carbide reactors was high but could
be reduced wr~n vieweu in terms of multiple produc-
tion. The cost of stai.nless steel reactors was
comparatively low since they were fabrIcated from
lengths o; standard pipe.
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(6) Availability/Delivery Time
These two factors, which are often very closely
linked, have proved to be an overiding influence in
materials selection. Frequently, Oi1lymaterials
that could be obcaaned within given time limita-
tions of the test programme were considered. This
was the case with the selection of stainless steel
over the more exotic silicon carbides. This situa-
tion militated against the use of an exotic or non-
standard engine~ring solution.
The final choice regarding the reactor material was
made using the vTeighted values technique deval.oped by
Waterman (16). 'J.nevarious candidate materials and
reactor requirements are set out in Table 4.4.
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REAcroR MATE:RIAL REOU1R~~TE['rrS
-
POROSiTY TE~1P. HIGH TEt4P. SERVIC'E LIFE FABRICA'rION CO$T AVAILABILITY/ ·DECISIONHATERIALS RESISTANCE OJRR03TCN J!:XPENTANCY DELiVERY TIHE.
Silicon Carbide 1 4 3 I - 3 3 3 17/30 = 0,57(niGride banded) ISilicon Carbide 3 3 1 1 - 2 1 11/30 = 0,37(Reaction bended .
Silicon Carbide 4 4 2 1 1 1 1 14/35 = 0,40(Class '.ned Manufacture)
Stainless Stee1 5 3 2 2 4 4 4 24/35 = 0,69Type 316L
Stainless Steel 5 4 2 2 4 3 3 23/35 = 0,66Type 310
Silica Glass 5 4 5 3 1 1 1 20/35 = 0,57
I
-...J
t-'
I
LP~ond :- 1 = Very poor or very expensive
2 = Poor
3 = Fair
4 = Good5 = Very good or acceptable cost.
(
The performance of the two candidate stainless steels
is given in Table 4.4. with decision factors of 0,69
and 0,66 for the Type 316L and 310 respectively. The
poorest decision facto~, 0,37, was achieved by the
reaction bonded silicon carbide. The difference
between the decision factors of the two stainless
steel types is due to the 30 percent more expensive
Type 310. The performance, however, of the Type 310
material is not appreciably better than that of the
Type 316L material.
Silica glass, which was successfully used on the labo-
ratory scale apparatus, would be the most suitable
material for the hydrochlorination process albeit for
some negative characteristics. It is very fragile and
brittle. The fabrication on even the pilot scale
reactor dimensions was not possfble , The cost was
expected to be very high since even the laboratory scale
silica glase reactor was expensive and in addition the
~ompleted unit would have to be imported. The best
delivery time was given at eight weeks.
/73•.....•.
An interesting feature to note at this juncture was the
rapid deterioration of silica glae:s in the presence of
lead oxide compounds at elevated temperature , This was
due to the formation of lead silicate. Increased
levels of lcad oxide compolli~dsin the precious metal
residues were periodically encountered and could be
expected from any future residue feed.
~he disappointing high temperature corrosion resistance
of the silicon carbide materials was discussed in sec-
tion 4.1.
The features which made the stainless steels an attrac-
tive option was that the material was sourced anrt
fabricated within this country. Delivery times were
consequently within one week. Testing downtime vas
therefore at 8 minimum.
Failure cf the stainless steel reactor did occur only
after 40 hours of service. This fact was expected and
accounted for. Figure 4.2. shows the failed portion of
the stainless steel Type 316L reactor.
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FIGURE 4.2. - Failed Portion of the Stainless Steel
Type 316L Reactor
It was not possible to weld repair the damaged portion
since the corrosion and material degradation was exten-
sive notably in the area corresponding to the hot zone
of the furnace.
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The cause of failure was ascribed to a deteruor-rtdon in
service due to the aggressive environment of hydrogen
chloride and sulphide gases at elevated temperature.
The failure mechanism was high temparature corrosion.
Extensive surface scaling of the reactor was observed.
Rapid scale grov~h consu~ed the stainless steel. With
the hydrogen chloride gas volatile reaction products
were formed which vapourized from the metal surface.
It is unclear to what extent sulfidation oCGurred. It
can be considered an additional failure mechanirm since
sulphide compounds were present in the precious metal
residues. It was very likely that low melting point
metal/metal sulphide eutect.Ics were present. The nickel
- nickel sulphide and iron - iron sulphide eutectics
with melting points of 645 and 985 °c could be assumed
to have been present.
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5. mNCLUSIONS AND RE(l)MMENDATIONS
(1) Stainless steel Types 31bL and 310 performed the
best undEr simulated high temperature corrosion
tests with corrosion rates of 138 and 224 milli-
metres per year respectively. Poor performances
were achieved by the silicon carbide engineering
ceramics.
(2) Thermal conductivities of the tested residue mate-
rials were in the region of 0,0001 cal/cm.s. °C.
(3)Hazard elements were identified on the hydrochlori-
nation process. The early failure, within twenty
minutes, of a hydrogen chloride gas regulator and
the spillage of this gas were idenUfied as hazards.
(4) Hazard evaluation took the form of an Event Tree
Analysis. This was used to quantitatively define
the relationship between four expected hazard
events, namely :-
• Hydrogen chloride gas supply
• Furnace operation
• Reactor failure
• Toxic exhaust gas emission.
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(5) Three failure regimes were observed on the hydro-
chlorination project.
(6) An exponential costing tec~~ique estimated the cost
of the proposed production hydrochlorination faci-
lity at R120 000.
(7) An economic evaluation was carried out. The
Expected Net Present Value over a five year period
with a 30 percent probability of successful earnings
was + R38 million. The Expected Rate of Feturn was
52 percent. The Expected Present Vulue Ratio was
+190 indi~ating satisfactory project eco~omics.
(8) The reactor material was selected using a weighted
values quantitative material selection procedure.
Stainless steel Types 316L and 310 were selected.
(9) Failure of the stainless steel Type 316L reactor
occurred after 40 hours service. The consumable
reactor concept was based on its replacement after
40 hours service. The cause of failure was due to
a deterioration in service due to the aggressive
environment of hydrogen chloride and sulphide '_5ases
at elevated temperatures. Failure mechanism was
high temperature corrosion with extensive surface
scaling.
(10) The most important consideration regarding this
project was the selection of a suitable reactor
material. The project was able to proceed by the
use of stainless steel Types 316L and 310.
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(11) This project PBS shown that it would be feasible to
commission a safe and profitable hydrochlorination
facility. The use of a consumable stainless steel
reactor would have to be carefully evaluated with
respect to future financial returns from precious
metal residues. Such a decision would ultimately
be for the decision of the company management •
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